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Playing	with	fire:	Brexit	and	the	decay	of	the	Good
Friday	Agreement
To	Brexit	negotiators,	Northern	Ireland	is	a	complex	nuisance.	But	the	crisis	has	exposed	the	slow
decay	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	and	the	EU	multilateralism	that	was	holding	this	divided
society	together,	writes	Duncan	Morrow	(Ulster	University).	The	bedrock	of	co-operation
between	London	and	Dublin	is	shattering	and	the	consequences	may	be	lasting.
Putting	an	end	to	decades	of	violence	in	an	impossibly	polarised	society	required	a	masterpiece	of
political	architecture.	In	the	face	of	hair-trigger	fragility,	the	Belfast	or	Good	Friday	Agreement
showed	astonishing	diplomatic	subtlety:	hard-wired	where	possible,	and	soft	and	expansive	where	necessary	(even
agreeing	on	two	names).	The	hard	legal	architecture	of	the	Agreement	was	designed	to	lock	in	the	seemingly
impossible	political	institutions.	But	flexibility	was	equally	essential	to	protect	reconciliation	from	the	inevitable	but
unpredictable	problems:	to	absorb	the	aftershocks	in	the	political	‘ring	of	fire’	of	Northern	Ireland,	and	to	meet
pragmatic	accommodations	and	negotiated	retreats	–	without	triggering	humiliation.
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Thus	were	Unionists	reluctantly	persuaded	to	concede	that	setting	their	face	against	all	Irishness	in	the	north	was	a
hopeless	cause.	Likewise,	republicans	were	cajoled	into	abandoning	their	pursuit	of	a	United	Ireland	through
violence,	and	accepting	that	it	was	postponed	into	an	indefinite	future.	The	complexities	of	antagonism	demanded
that	the	letter	of	the	Agreement	could	sometimes	be	reconfigured	–	and	some	room	to	manoeuvre	was	understood	to
be	vital.	The	‘bedrock’	(or	backstop?)	was	British	and	Irish	governments	agreement	to	agree	to	undertake	all
necessary	action	to	maintain	the	fundamental	direction	of	travel,	or	at	least	to	prevent	any	return	to	violence.
The	entire	peace	project	can	only	be	understood	as	the	fruit	of	years	of	prior	commitments	starting	with	the	Anglo-
Irish	Agreement	13	years	earlier,	when	both	governments	“wishing	further	to	develop	the	unique	relationship
between	their	peoples	and	the	close	co-operation	between	their	countries	as	friendly	neighbours	and	as	partners	in
the	European	Community”	recognised
“the	major	interest	of	both	their	countries	and,	above	all,	of	the	people	of	Northern	Ireland	in	diminishing	the	divisions
there	and	achieving	lasting	peace	and	stability”.
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Ten	years	on,	the	inter-governmental	‘framework	documents’	unambiguously	declared	that	“the	most	urgent	and
important	issue	facing	the	people	of	Ireland,	North	and	South,	and	the	British	and	Irish	Governments	together,	is	to
remove	the	causes	of	conflict,	to	overcome	the	legacy	of	history	and	to	heal	the	divisions	which	have	resulted.”	To
this	end,	both	governments	agreed	that	this	new	framework	would	“develop	to	keep	pace	with	the	growth	of
harmonisation	and	with	greater	integration	between	the	two	economies.”	They	held	out	the	hope	that	“the	divisive
issue	of	sovereignty	might	cease	to	be	symbolic	of	the	domination	of	one	community	over	another”	and	that	“the
relationship	between	the	traditions	in	Northern	Ireland	could	become	a	positive	bond	of	further	understanding,	co-
operation	and	amity,	rather	than	a	source	of	contention,	between	the	wider	British	and	Irish	democracies.”
In	this	light,	the	British	and	Irish	were	not	so	much	guarantors	of	the	specific	text	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	(the
hard	wiring)	as	guarantors	of	the	Agreement	as	the	centrepiece	of	a	deeper	historic	project	(away	from	violence	and
towards	reconciliation,	tolerance	and	mutual	trust).	Crucially,	their	relationship	as	partners	in	an	open-bordered
European	Community/Union	was	the	bedrock	which	underpinned	harmonisation,	flexible	understandings	of
sovereignty	and	efforts	to	resolve	the	Northern	Ireland	conundrum	in	a	spirit	of	reconciliation,	rather	than	domination
or	resistance.
But	British-Irish	partnership	on	the	GFA	approach	was	more	than	implied	in	the	text:	it	was	presupposed	and	utterly
essential.	Only	in	this	context	does	the	Agreement	add	up–	in	its	constitutional	and	citizenship	radicalism,	in	the
doctrine	of	parity	of	esteem,	in	the	primacy	of	human	rights	and	in	the	inter-connectedness	of	three	intercultural,
intergovernmental	and	international	strands.
Nobody	wrote	the	theory	down	in	black	letters	in	1998,	because	any	attempt	to	do	so	would	have	brought	all	practical
progress	to	an	immediate	halt.	The	wisdom	of	softly-softly	dictated	that	Unionists	and	Nationalists	could	sign	up	to
the	specifics	–	as	long	as	they	were	not	required	to	give	up	nationalism.	While	both	Unionists	and	Nationalists
acknowledged	reconciliation,	but	mostly	as	a	‘least	worst’	compromise,	they	were	bought	to	the	table	through
conceding	the	right	to	remain	ideologically	opposed	while	sharing	in	practice.
At	the	same	time,	the	soft	edges	of	detail	were	only	credible	because	they	stood	on	a	bedrock	commitment	to
negotiated	inter-state	partnership.	The	risk,	inevitably,	was	that	flexibility	and	imprecision	would	decay	into	fudge:
that	a	commitment	to	reconciliation	(‘positive	peace’	in	the	jargon)	would	decay	into	buying	off	the	potential	for
violence	(negative	peace)	and	then	indifference.	In	reality,	however,	that	could	only	happen	with	the	permission	or
neglect	of	the	governments,	who	remained,	both	formally	and	informally,	in	ultimate	authority.
Disastrously,	this	appears	to	be	what	happened.,	although	the	decay	of	British	and	Irish	governmental	commitment	to
their	own	core	project	since	1998	was	largely	accomplished	by	stealth.	The	key	moments	can,	however,	be
identified:	after	the	collapse	of	the	Assembly	in	2002,	the	governments	moved	from	pursuing	the	highest	common
factor	(reconciliation)	to	securing	the	lowest	common	denominator	(stability	and	devolved	government).	The
demands	of	partnership	were	loosened	to	focus	on	the	security	and	political	hard	core,	illustrated	by	the
abandonment	of	offending	elements	of	the	1998	Agreement	at	St	Andrews.	The	theory	then	was	that	devolution
would	lead	to	a	shared	future	and	lead	reconciliation,	not	vice	versa.	That	theory	has	proven	flawed	in	practice,	as
the	vision	of	the	Agreement	gave	way	to	the	loveless	marriage	of	forced	coalition	punctuated	increasingly	by
extended	‘time	on	our	own’.	Within	weeks	of	taking	office,	’shared	future’	policy	had	been	discarded	and	stability
seemed	increasingly	dependent	on	finding	sufficient	resources	to	support	partisan	projects.
The	arrival	of	devolution	coincided	with	the	world	financial	crisis	and	with	new	leaders,	governments	and	priorities	in
both	London	and	Dublin.	With	each	step,	the	interest	of	either	government	in	direct	responsibility	in	Northern	Ireland
or	making	more	than	occasional	gestures	declined	further.	Once	policing	was	devolved	after	a	serious	crisis	in	2010,
the	engagement	of	the	governments	was	always	preceded	by	crisis.,	albeit	with	increasing	regularity	and	rising
frustration.	Still,	London	and	Dublin	restricted	themselves	to	desperately	patching	up	the	leaking	ship	–	as
bystanders	around	the	Haass	talks	in	2013,	as	donor-participants	in	Stormont	House	in	2014	and	Fresh	Start	in
2016.
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Over	time,	the	governments	proved	willing	to	set	aside	any	parts	of	the	text	of	the	Agreement	where	they	judged	it
might	upset	the	governing	arrangements	of	Northern	Ireland.	Positive	aspirations	were	always	postponed	until
negative	peace	was	assured.	The	declared	principle	was	that	the	less	important	aspects	should	be	sacrificed	for	the
prize.	Thus	no	serious	effort	was	made	to	reform	the	obviously	flawed	mechanisms	of	the	Assembly.	Other	parts	of
the	deal	were	in	practice	treated	as	‘decorative’,	including	the	Civic	Forum,	any	Bill	of	Rights	or	significant	action	to
promote	integrated	education.	Yet	while	devolution	was	kept	on	the	road,	there	was	still	no	sign	of	reconciliation,
tolerance	and	mutual	trust.
None	of	this	might	have	surfaced	beyond	Northern	Ireland,	if	the	Brexit	crisis	had	not	shaken	the	British-Irish
partnership	itself.	It	seems	clear	that	nobody	in	the	Conservative	party	–	neither	David	Cameron	nor	the	Brexiteers	–
thought	much	about	their	commitments	under	Good	Friday	Agreement.	But	once	the	foundations	shook,
commitments	by	both	governments	and	the	European	Union	that	‘the	Good	Friday	Agreement	would	be	upheld	in	all
of	its	parts’	were	exposed	as	essentially	uncertain	given	the	careful	pragmatism	of	previous	years.	Even	worse,	the
systemic	complacency	about	the	Agreement’s	core	purpose	–	reconciliation,	tolerance	and	mutual	trust	–	leaves
important	issues	at	risk.
In	Northern	Ireland,	Brexit	as	economics	gives	way	to	Brexit	as	politics,	because	stability	in	Northern	Ireland	was
implicitly	dependent	on	the	kind	of	harmonisation	and	multilateralism	made	possible	by	the	EU.	Since	1985,	Britain
and	Ireland	could	be	partners	more	often	than	opponents,	the	four	freedoms	shaped	a	common	approach	to
outsiders	on	both	islands,	and	permanent,	mutually	interchangeable	citizenship	turned	out	to	be	feasible.	So	queues
of	lorries	in	Dover	are	an	economic	challenge:	queues	of	lorries	in	Newry	are	a	constitutional	crisis.	In	the	absence	of
an	underpinning	commitment	to	manage	and	nudge	Northern	Ireland	towards	a	shared	future	in	which	Britishness
and	Irishness	are	as	seamlessly	engaged	as	possible,	the	future	becomes	a	matter	of	fingers	crossed	and	breath
held.
Textual	disputes	about	what	does	or	does	not	breach	the	Agreement	in	Brexit	have	become	the	order	of	the	day.
While	one	side	upholds	the	absolute	nature	of	UK	sovereignty,	the	other	points	to	parity	of	esteem,	North-South
bodies	and	the	couple	constitutional	balance.	All	of	a	sudden,	the	text,	and	only	the	text	matters,	and	there	is	no
master-interpreter.	But	if	the	text	was	always	secondary	to	the	new	relationship,	the	text	alone	cannot	carry	the
weight	of	the	choices.	If	reconciliation	is	now	to	be	relative	rather	than	absolute	–	and	agreed	sovereignty	to	be
interpreted	as	unconditional	sovereignty	–	the	consequences	are	going	to	be	unpredictable.
Without	devolved	government	for	over	500	days	now,	Britain	and	Ireland	cannot	agree	on	what	comes	next	for
Northern	Ireland.	Caught	between	their	reliance	on	the	DUP	at	Westminster,	the	desire	not	to	have	to	become
embroiled	once	more	in	managing	Northern	Ireland,	and	the	possibility	that	one	false	move	could	over-balance	the
entire	Brexit	strategy,	the	British	approach	for	18	months	has	been	to	hold	their	breath	in	an	astonishingly	brazen
performance	of	‘government	by	absence’.	Without	any	obvious	alternative,	the	result	has	been	the	short	term	death
of	politics	in	Northern	Ireland.	Northern	Ireland’s	input	to	Brexit	was	largely	reduced	to	the	contradictory	politics	of	the
DUP	in	London	and	Sinn	Fein	in	Dublin.
Some,	of	course,	have	seen	this	as	their	moment	of	opportunity.	The	DUP,	Jamie	Bryson	and	Kate	Hoey	MP	always
opposed	the	Agreement’s	internationalism	and	have	openly	encouraged	this	collapse	–	some	with	more	candour
than	others.	But	without	an	unbreakable	commitment	to	British-Irish	partnership,	reconciliation	in	Northern	Ireland
inevitably	falls	apart:	at	the	very	least	politically,	at	the	worst	in	a	frightening	way.
Searching	for	a	soundbite	in	1998,	Tony	Blair	reached	for	the	‘hand	of	history’.	Although	the	phrase	was	the	subject
of	some	ridicule,	it	was	clear	that	he	had	also	caught	the	weight	of	the	Good	Friday	moment.	It	is	important	to
remember	that	in	Northern	Ireland	Brexit	is	not	only	economics	or	politics:	it	is	history.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Professor	Duncan	Morrow	is	a	lecturer	in	politics	at	Ulster	University	and	has	published	widely	in	the	fields	of	conflict
resolution,	Northern	Ireland	politics	and	the	relationship	between	religion	and	politics.
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